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Imperial Nostalgia and Bitter Reality: The United Kingdom, the 
United States and Brexit, Implications for Regional Integration 
Abstract 
Brexit and America First are undeniable examples of a return to state-based politics. This 
article examines the dichotomy of identity and the state, which has given rise to imperial 
nostalgia. Nevertheless, the decisions of the elites and the dominant majorities may lead to 
the fragmentation of the United Kingdom. London has shown itself to be weak in the face of 
China, Russia, and India and it is not clear if, over the long term, it will be influential in the 
global political struggles in which the latter countries are challenging the power of the 
United States. There are even doubts as to whether the United Kingdom can articulate a 
strategic alliance with the United States, due to their respective differences over relations 
with China and Russia. The dispute for world hegemony is also being challenged by the 
forces of surveillance capitalism, which not only threatens regional cooperation and 
immigration, but also the ecosystem and the very future of the species. 
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Introduction 
 
The conceptual framework of this article is identity security, as defined by 
the Copenhagen School. It reconstructs some keys to the imperial past that 
Rome, the United Kingdom, and the United States have repeated down the 
ages. It also explains the wide scope of the Anglosphere, which has laid the 
basis for the unity between the United Kingdom, the United States, 
Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. This backdrop helps explain the 
profundity of the special relationship between London and Washington, 
which share ideology and motivations, but not power, influence, and 
political objectives. This article thus traces the contradictions of British 
identity as defined in opposition to the other: The European Union, 
immigrants, and terrorists. Donald Trump has followed a similar path 
with his policy of America First, in opposition to Mexico and Latin 
America. 
 
Although the state is the central unit of international security studies, the 
reality is that this level of analysis pales in the face of surveillance 
capitalism, which is global and transnational. This is even true in the 
struggle between the United States and China for world hegemony. These 
trends are threatening not only regions, but especially individuals, 
migrations, and the ecosystem, as detailed below. 
 
Identity, Culture, and History 
 
In a classic sense, the Peace of Westphalia formed the basis for the concept 
of national security in place at the end of World War II. National and 
international security studies followed this path as subdisciplines of 
international relations that sought to differentiate between imperialism, 
militarism, and geopolitics. They traced lines of convergence with the 
realism that dominated in the majority of the world and developed as part 
of the broad spectrum of international studies. In the 1980s, 
expansionism, constructivism, critical theory, and Marxism problematised 
the exclusive dimension of the military and nuclear components of 
security. These new approaches included the state and its population as an 
axis for the defence of a country’s territory, institutions, and borders and 
criticised the ethnocentric vision of the metropoles that led the field of 
international security studies. This article, it is worth stating, is written by 
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a Mexican scholar who has studied in both the metropolis and the 
periphery, and this background undoubtedly permeates its analysis.1 
 
In the 1980s, there was a turn towards the study of identity security 
through an analysis of the communities that make up a nation-state and 
the ways in which they identify themselves and each other. Identity 
security has been a natural evolution of the developments seen in 
international security studies over the last four decades in the West. The 
English School has also conceptualised the international and local 
dimensions of security as the world society, focusing on the role of norms 
and rules in international security.2 
 
The conceptual axis of this article is identity. For some members of 
Europe, identity is made up of ethnicity, language, blood, and culture, 
concepts associated with nationality that run through a state’s history and 
personality. Identity is also composed of local ethnicities and pluralistic 
origins that feed both the local and the national, as is the case of the 
United Kingdom and the populations of Northern Ireland, Scotland, 
Wales, and England, to cite one example. The main issue explored here is 
identity security, the role of the state, and its limitations and 
contradictions vis-à-vis capitalism. These issues, in turn, have a 
connection to ideology and political mobilisation, which drove the 
dominant forces of the United Kingdom to take the country out of the 
European Union in the crisis-ridden Brexit process.3 
 
A threat to identity is a threat to who we are: A threat to the ideas, history, 
and self-image of the dominant forces. Societal security feeds on identity; 
it incorporates emotions and perceptions. There are exponentially growing 
fears regarding immigration and the threatened loss of space and 
competitiveness. The security strategy thus exacerbates the threat of the 
other and eventually seeks limitations on the rights of immigrants. 
 
The situation reaches a level of alarm when there is a terrorist attack on 
the established population. Identity security seeks to persecute 
immigrants, reduce their rights, stop their demographic growth, and 
exercise strict border controls. In short, national security is a battleground 
between the forces of globalisation and regionalisation and the history and 
culture that define the state. In the case of the United Kingdom, its 
ancestral past becomes useful. Here it is worth introducing a criticism of 
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the academic mainstream of international security studies. Imperial 
tendencies did not disappear at the end of World War II, yet this has not 
prevented the advance of the geopolitics of emerging actors. The 
ethnocentric, Anglo-Saxon world has been unable to enclose emerging 
powers such as Russia, China, or India, which are defying the liberal world 
order that emerged from the two world wars. 
 
Certainly, the imperial sense points to external interests and a connection 
with the outside world. Within a country, it becomes more problematic 
because it has to do with the integration or disintegration of identity. Over 
the long term, in terms of the struggle for hegemony, surveillance 
capitalism is eroding the state, which makes the exercise of sovereignty 
and the security of the population, the international system, and the 
ecosystem much more complex. In this way, and despite the return to the 
imperial past, the capacity of domestic, regional, or world politics to 
preserve and strengthen international and regional security in the face of 
surveillance capitalism is weakening and becoming inefficient. 
 
The Roots of Empire 
 
Although the United Nations and international society declared 
imperialism to be politically incorrect following World War II, the reality 
is that it never disappeared from countries such as the United Kingdom 
and the United States. We can see this in the actions undertaken following 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Ideologues and decision-
makers in Washington revived imperial influences in the circles around 
the George W. Bush White House and Prime Minister Tony Blair: Leaders 
who busied themselves with the Global War on Terrorism and the invasion 
of Iraq.4 
 
Both capitals have distinct styles, but they currently share an undeniable 
conviction somewhere between modernity and tradition, in which they 
look to the achievements of Julius Caesar in expanding his empire to 
Britain, North Africa, the Middle East, and Jerusalem. This motor of 
imperial strength gave rise to a civilisation that was the most powerful and 
far-reaching of its time, lasting for generations and centuries. Great 
Britain and the United States pay their respects to Rome’s military 
achievements, architecture, and contributions to order, knowledge, and 
science. It is therefore worth revisiting some of these roots, which have 
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manifested themselves in the voices of Donald Trump and Boris Johnson. 
In the case of the latter, however, nostalgia for the British past has turned 
out to be insufficient in the 21st Century. 
 
The Idea of the Past in the Present 
 
Julius Caesar launched two invasions of Britain, bringing this space into 
the Roman orbit. This process would later lead to the establishment of 
Roman Britain between the years 55 and 54 B.C.E. As one author writes, 
“Towns grew and a network of roads facilitated trade and communication. 
Rarely at the centre of Roman political life, until the late 3rd Century 
Britain avoided the instability of other parts of the Empire.”5 Essential to 
the Romanisation of Britain was the presence of the army and the 
organisation of legions of over 16,000 men. Belonging to the army helped 
the British to obtain citizenship, but they also had to learn Latin, which 
was key to administration and the relationship with the metropolis. On 
this basis, the Roman order lasted in Britain for around 400 years, 
opening it up to the world and creating an urban system in London, still 
visible to this day in its sewers and architecture. This process also later 
involved the conversion of the British to Christianity, the natural evolution 
of laicism and native religion. In any case, the advance of both societies 
allowed for a cultural overlap. This fusion was not total, as the British 
temperament led the country to guard its roots, which it now proudly 
shows off to the world.6 In the 19th Century, Britain’s historic aspirations 
came to fruition: An industrial empire flourished up through the first 
quarter of the 20th Century. Led by the Royal Navy, hard work, 
technological innovation, and a global vision facilitated the rise of the 
Victorian era. The growth of a middle class expanded access to the power 
that industry and navigation extended to North America (Canada and the 
United States) in the 17th Century. Along with Australia and New Zealand, 
this expansionism laid the basis for the Anglosphere.7 
 
While, in terms of the depth and effectiveness of the colonial empire, class 
was more important than religion, political preferences, and family 
background, “what really mattered was whether you had gone to the right 
schools and universities.”8 One trend that permeated the 19th Century was 
the individual capacity of citizens to rise in a highly competitive society. 
The British educational system taught Greek and Latin in both the 
colonies and in the metropolis. In the field of power, one line of continuity 
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with the Roman Empire was respect for law and order, as well as the 
teaching of Latin. The British Empire taught a similar curriculum in the 
colonies, only with English taking the place of Latin. Certainly, the 
complement of this was a mentality of intellectual superiority and vertical 
paternalism. As Kwarteng argues, “the empire was anti-democratic.”9 The 
basis of this empire was an individualism marked by strength, intellect, 
and leadership that imposed itself on others. Kwarteng concludes, “in the 
Classical Greek sense, the British Empire was an aristocratic empire, and it 
openly celebrated ‘rule by the best people.’”10 
 
In the 19th and early 20th Centuries, this imperial vision advanced the 
foreign policy interests of the British Crown in an expansive, colonial 
fashion. The United Kingdom forged a strategic alliance with the United 
States and Canada at the end of the 20th Century and clearly identified 
Japan, Germany, and Italy as its global rivals, even confronting them in 
World War II. The imperial idea implies the external role of the state, 
seeking to reinforce its power outside its borders. 
 
Imperial Change and Continuity 
 
The provenance of the United States lies in the United Kingdom. The 
American Revolution, launched on July 4, 1776, broke with the British 
Crown, but not with its century-old linguistic, religious, and cultural roots. 
It even forged an origin of blood, values, and culture that would construct 
the norms and character of a new power. 
 
The United Kingdom has given Washington an inexhaustible source of 
inspiration in developing its own national project, allowing it to both 
reaffirm its identity and its institutional and political differences. The 
exceptionality of the American project lies, for example, in its democratic 
norms, with federalism, the separation of powers, and elections for the 
House of Representatives every two years, the Senate every six years, and 
the president every four years. The Commander-in-Chief is the head of the 
executive branch, handling both wars and commercial treaties. Precisely 
due to these profound communicating vessels of history and culture, the 
United States and the United Kingdom have developed a special 
relationship over the last century. The Americas are the zone of influence 
for the United States, as are Europe and Africa for the United Kingdom. In 
the case of the United States, its values, norms, and laws built its colonial 
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and later republican institutions. The “more perfect union” born out of the 
War of Independence joined the secular constitutional tradition with the 
Judeo-Christian tradition. “An assembly of semigods,” Jefferson called it.11 
 
Despite the break with the British Crown, the United States developed its 
own expansionist impulse. Examples of this include the Declaration of 
Independence, Jefferson’s Empire of Liberty (1801), the Monroe Doctrine 
(1823), the wars with Mexico (1846-47) and Spain (1898), and, finally, 
World War II.12 At the end of the 19th Century, Washington and London 
laid the basis for the Anglosphere. The United Kingdom was the hegemon 
of the 19th and early 20th Centuries, and the United States the heir to said 
hegemony following World War II. The subsequent liberal order that arose 
from the ashes of the two world wars is an Anglo-Saxon vision of the 
world, in which there converge values and interests such as trade, security, 
intelligence, and international organisations created to project the political 
interests of the United States.13 
 
In the end, the special relationship is the source of a constant exchange in 
language, culture, history, religion, families, science, intelligence, and 
civil-military relationships. In contrast with Australia and Canada, 
perhaps only the United Kingdom and the United States share an imperial 
vision of the world. In addition, this establishes an important difference 
with continental Europe and an even more abysmal one with Latin 
America. 
 
The Anglosphere and the Empire 
 
The Anglosphere consists of the idea of British exceptionalism, which 
includes its former colonies: The United States, Canada, Australia, and 
New Zealand. All these English-speaking countries share a series of 
elemental factors: Free market economies, respect for the law, 
parliamentary democracy, and Protestantism. On this basis, they have 
developed the most profound security and intelligence strategy on Earth: 
Five Eyes.14 
 
The concept of the Anglosphere goes back to the time of Queen Victoria 
and it has never shaken off its imperial roots, which lie in its DNA. As a 
result, the United Kingdom was unable to reconcile its imperial origins 
with the exercise of soft power during the formation of the European 
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Union. Nevertheless, it was able to facilitate the smooth transition from 
the hegemony of Great Britain to that of the United States of America.15 
 
Given this background, the role of the state in the United Kingdom 
advanced over the decades with imperial nostalgia. On the domestic plane, 
this served to give unity to the nation’s pluralism. Yet things changed with 
the country’s integration into the European Union and increasing 
immigration. In other words, the imperial idea has not only influenced 
British identity, but has also shaped its foreign policy and the external 
aspect of its national security. Surveillance capitalism has also put this 
traditional vision into question, as detailed below. 
 
British Identity 
 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 had a profound effect on the 
character of the United Kingdom. Prime Minister Tony Blair, defending an 
us, affirmed his country’s linguistic, cultural, and religious ties with the 
United States and drew a line dividing this us from the other: The 
barbarians, the Muslims. Identity and language marked a national security 
system that became discriminatory and orchestrated the invasion of Iraq. 
The United Kingdom, hand-in-hand with the United States, looked back to 
the Western crusade against Islam, now perpetuated in the Global War on 
Terrorism. In 2005, there was a brutal terrorist attack in London. This 
deepened the trend towards controls over borders and human mobility, 
and even led to the creation of a National Security Council. By delimiting 
the other and experiencing the consequences of terrorism, sectors of 
British conservatism increasingly travelled down the path towards 
separating the United Kingdom from the European Union. 
 
The attack legitimated the difference between us and the other. The 
affirmation of identity allowed for the creation of a siege mentality: The 
original, foundational, age-old population, versus the other, those from 
elsewhere, the Muslims, the barbarians. This differentiation allowed for 
the construction of a rhetoric, a discourse, and a political mobilisation that 
identified a problem (the European Union) and an enemy (immigrants). 
The logic of exclusion thus formed the basis for the Brexit campaign. 
 
Counter-terrorism limited freedom and expanded the espionage and 
surveillance powers of the state. Action and discourse combined in norms 
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that conceived of intervention mechanisms to face the perpetual 
perception of threats. This process has ended up securitising British 
identity, which has led to situations that threaten the interests of the state 
and nation. 
 
The threatening identity of the other is recognisable: Different languages, 
races, religions, cultures, and geographies that, as Kathlyn Fisher argues in 
Security Identity and British Counterterrorism, legitimise discrimination. 
In 2014, Theresa May stripped immigrants of their citizenship if the 
government had identified them as being dangerous, an exceptional 
measure to separate, exclude, and even persecute those who do not belong. 
The construction of the discourse on terrorism arises from a change in 
perception following specific events, which clouds thinking, relying instead 
on rage and fear, and eclipsing coexistence with the other, human 
mobility, and globalisation.16 
 
Despite these needs and changes, Great Britain faces the dilemma of our 
times: Combining rationality and unity in order to provide security for the 
territory and the population in the face of global and regional dynamics. 
This difficult balance has become unsustainable for the European Union 
and North America. The state demands a deeper exercise of sovereignty. 
The United Kingdom has failed, however, to face the challenges of 
globalisation through discrimination and border controls. Within its 
borders, this feeds the fragmentation of the different identities that make 
up the kingdom. 
 
The Relevance of National Security 
 
The watershed moment in the U.K. security system was the invasion of 
Iraq in 2003. Tony Blair was widely criticised because he had no doctrine 
or system that would have ordered national security priorities, as proved 
by the country’s entrance in the Global War on Terrorism. This even led to 
splits among high-ranking diplomatic officials, military officers, 
intelligence agents, and domestic security agents, including the local 
police. 
 
In effect, the lack of proportionality between the short and long term and 
between the local and the global not only led to a split within the Prime 
Minister’s cabinet, but also with parliament, the Queen, and the nation. 
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With the war in Iraq, the United Kingdom entered an asymmetric conflict 
in a disorganised fashion and with no diagnostics, which ended up being 
disastrous for what was once a great empire. This conflict of global 
proportions lacked an analysis of risks, harming national interests over the 
long term and bringing the country into the orbit of terrorist attacks in 
Europe.17 The absence of a joint doctrinal and institutional vision led to an 
unprecedented debate in parliament and in the streets. This destroyed the 
consensus on the special relationship between the United States and Great 
Britain and, more importantly, damaged the consensus on the 
intervention in the conflict within the United Kingdom. 
 
The need for a comprehensive articulation between the local and the 
global hurried the creation of an exceptional conception to order and 
assign roles, functions, and responsibilities, in line with the United 
Kingdom’s role in the world. The assignation of diplomatic, military, and 
intelligence roles, ordered by a higher objective, opened up a space for the 
National Security Council and the National Security Doctrine.18 The key 
figure here, for instance, is the National Security Adviser, whose 
institutional status promotes the creation of doctrine. The government 
then established a system that brings together and prioritises domestic, 
regional, and international activities through structure, diplomacy, 
defence, and intelligence. The key to the birth of this system lay in the 
need to prioritise and make transparent the use of power. 
 
Despite this important institutional development, Great Britain was 
unable to anticipate its most important crisis since the end of World War 
II: Brexit. The National Security Doctrine states that the country’s most 
important relationships in terms of projecting its power are with 
Washington and Brussels, via the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
Nevertheless, the 2016 Brexit referendum came as a surprise, representing 
the beginning of the fragmentation of the kingdom itself. This explains the 
collapse of its ability to project its power in the 21st Century. Formally, the 
Treaty of Union itself is at play: Scotland and Northern Ireland have 
indicated that they may leave the country in order to remain in the 
European Union. This article will examine this political threat, which has 
not yet become a legal reality, later on. 
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Brexit: The Debate on the Nation and the State 
 
In the United Kingdom, there has always been a feeling of superiority with 
regard to Europe, a mentality known as Euroscepticism. Three decades of 
resistance and doubts among different conservative forces came together 
with David Cameron’s election as Prime Minister in 2015. The doubts of 
the former Prime Minister, which led him to explore leaving the European 
Union via a referendum, date back to at least 2007.19 
 
Just before the triumph of Brexit, Cameron foresaw the forces that the 
plebiscite would unleash: Nativism, racism, nationalism, and populism. 
Tony Blair and John Major, in a visit to Northern Ireland, warned that 
Brexit would mean the breakup of the United Kingdom, and possibly an 
economic disaster for the nation.20 The final outcome of this situation is 
still unknown. 
 
The principal actors in this episode – David Cameron, Michael Gore, Boris 
Johnson, Nigel Farage, Arron Banks, and Dominic Cummings – 
represented different forces of inflamed nationalist conservatism. They 
believed in the preëminence of the United Kingdom in terms of race, 
culture, history, and language. This vision clashed with the integration, 
cosmopolitanism, cultural diversity, and immigration that, for decades, 
the European Union has stood for. 
 
Brexit was an argument for independence from the European Union and 
its free trade, human mobility, and Brussels-based bureaucracy, but it was 
unable to foresee the consequences of this independence. The movement 
in favour of leaving the European Union argued for recovering state 
sovereignty in order to decide the country’s future and to return foreign 
policy to its former preëminence through a new popular mandate. Brexit’s 
perspectives include that of recovering control over borders, integration, 
the welfare state, and national security, based on a Global Britain that 
would seek to return to its imperial roots. Although there is no consensus, 
Boris Johnson described it better than anyone else did: The European 
Union lacks a head. Rome was led by Caesar and “we need” a strong state 
to provide certainty for the global projection of British civilisation, which 
lies in the “The Dream of Rome.”21 
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On the other hand, Cameron gave a speech at the British Museum in which 
he said, “Isolationism has never served this country well. Whenever we 
turn our back on Europe, sooner or later we come to regret it…The 
European Union has helped reconcile countries which were once at each 
others’ throats for decades.”22 Some 75 percent of the young people who 
voted in the Brexit referendum preferred to remain. The great dilemma, 
for them, lay in preferring permanence and mobility throughout the 
European Union to isolationism. In their own words, it meant: 
 
We are Europeans, we’re citizens of the world. We didn’t vote to leave 
Europe, but you’re snatching it away from us. 16 and 17-year-olds 
weren’t even asked. A 90-year-old has more of a say in the rest of our 
lives than we do. We weren’t listened to and you want to take away our 
future.23 
 
In the view of those young people who voted to remain, what was going on 
was a nostalgia for a past that no longer existed, and that, in the end, 
represented a rupture. This generation was clear: “I’m genuinely 
heartbroken by the entire thing. We’re no longer a United Kingdom. We 
have a deeply divided country and, for a 24-year-old woman, I think that’s 
really terrifying.” In the end, the remain vote showed a deep breakdown in 
British society.24 
 
Weakness in the Face of Global Politics 
 
The Iraq War discredited the United States and the United Kingdom at the 
global level. Washington embarked on the Global War on Terrorism in the 
Middle East for at least a decade. Following Obama’s inauguration in 
January 2009, the United Kingdom was just one more foreign policy 
priority for the United States, which sought to disengage from the Middle 
East and Europe and redirect its priorities towards Asia and the Pacific 
through its pivot policy.25 
 
In a certain sense, this war by the United States and the United Kingdom 
favoured the emergence of Russia and China in Eurasian and global 
politics. Certainly, the rise of new actors in hegemonic global politics 
allows us to make a contrast showing the limits of British power in the 21st 
Century (see Table 1  for more detail). The country, for example, has a 
population of barely 65.6 million residents and a surface area of 243,305 
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km2; it is the fifth most prosperous economy in the world; has the sixth 
highest military spending; is the fifth most important nuclear power and is 
the 20th biggest oil producer. The imperial idea pales in comparison with 
the present realities of China, India, and Russia and, of course, the United 
States.26 There is no doubt that the power of the United Kingdom is still 
significant in world politics, but it is far from what it was in the 19th 
Century. Furthermore, it is much less than what China and Russia can 
achieve together, with their enormous territories, populations, armies, and 
nuclear and space spending. 
 
Table 1. The United Kingdom in the fight for global political hegemony 
Source: Author 
 
Perhaps this explains some of the deeper motivations driving the 
nationalist and conservative forces in the United Kingdom to leave the 
European Union. This is deeper than imperial nostalgia. Looking towards 
the future, these are real concerns for recovering its way, which it lost over 
the years. In this context, it is seeking to strengthen its strategic alliance 
with the United States of Donald Trump. Despite the leadership crisis in 
the United States, the country continues to be the leading power of the 
international system. It has a surface area of 9,833,517 km2, a 
population of 325.14 million residents, and is the world’s third largest oil 
producer, but its biggest consumer. The United States is also the world’s 
biggest spender on defence, the space race, and the nuclear race: A true 
heavyweight. 
 
Yet Washington is not the only superpower in the world. Over the last 
decade, Republicans and Democrats representing a variety of ideological 
 Territory 
in km2 
(2019) 
Population 
in millions 
of people 
(2017)  
GDP in 
billions of 
dollars 
(2017) 
Defence 
spending 
in billions 
of dollars 
(2019) 
Nuclear 
warheads 
(2019) 
Space 
Race 
spending 
in billions 
of dollars 
(2014)  
United 
States 
9,833,517 325.14 19,485.39 716 1750 39.33 
United 
Kingdom 
243,305 65.6 2,637.87 47.5 215 0.34 
Russia 17,098,242 144.49 1,578.42 44 1600 8.69 
China 9,596,960 1,386.4 12,237.7 224 290 10.77 
India 3,287,263 1,339.18 2,650.73 55.2 140 4.27 
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currents within their respective parties have presented evidence and new 
strategies for countering the Beijing-Moscow alliance, both regionally and 
globally. An alliance between China and Russia is enough to make the 
United States and Europe worry. Indirectly, this transition of power fed 
the vision of Global Britain and the desire to leave the European Union to 
follow in the footsteps of the United States, but it is precisely here where 
we find a crisis of identity and real power.27 
 
China, in turn, has the largest population on Earth: 1.386 billion people. It 
also has the largest army in the world, the second largest Gross Domestic 
Product, the second highest spending on the space race and the arms race, 
and the fourth highest spending on the nuclear race. Due to its size, it 
conceives of itself as a country/continent – it is the fifth biggest country in 
the world, nearly the size of all of Europe. Additionally, it is an astonishing 
cultural powerhouse, coming in second place in total number of World 
Heritage Sites. While the United Kingdom is the home of a civilisation 
with over two thousand years of history and the birthplace of a language 
that has made countless contributions to science and world culture, 
Chinese civilisation is around six thousand years old. From Beijing’s 
perspective, India, Egypt, and Persia share a similar level of antiquity, 
which gives them preëminence and meaning in its current Belt and Road 
initiative.28 
 
China shares a border with Russia, and it is with this country that it has its 
most important alliance globally and strategically, but it is not its only ally. 
Russia is the largest country on Earth, the biggest oil producer in the 
world, has the world’s biggest nuclear reserves, the third highest spending 
on the space race, the fifth largest army in the world, and the eighth 
highest military spending. The strategic reservations regarding its power 
lie in its place as the 11th most important economy in the world, which 
leads there to be doubts about whether Russia can truly oust the United 
States.29 Yet the world cannot dismiss the historical preëminence of the 
country that defeated Napoleon in 1812 and Hitler in 1945. The mentality 
of a superpower has returned in the leader of the largest country in the 
world, Vladimir Putin. 
 
India is a former colony of the United Kingdom, but its rise in world 
politics has been considerable. It has a surface area of 3,287,263 km2, a 
population of 1,339,180.13 residents, and its Gross Domestic Product is 
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2,650 billion dollars. It is the country with the fourth highest defence 
spending, the seventh highest nuclear budget, and the fourth highest 
spending on the space race. While India still lags behind the United States, 
Russia, and China, it has shown tremendous military development. India 
nevertheless feels threatened by Beijing along its northern border. In 
recent years, it has developed a nuclear and technological capacity that has 
earned it the respect of China and Pakistan in regional and global 
inertias.30 
 
Great Britain is far from having the impact that Russia and China have on 
the world system. An additional consideration has to do with the 
expression of territoriality and power in the 21st Century: Russia, China, 
and India define their status in terms of their geography, population, 
labour force, natural resources, and freedom of access to other countries 
and cultures. The United Kingdom, meanwhile, is an island with a 
celebrated past that is currently fading before other hegemonies and 
regions. Paradoxically, and perhaps for that reason, its trump card in the 
post-Brexit era may, perhaps, be the reencounter with the United States. 
The domestic cost of following Trump will be high, as it is possible that 
this will revive the country’s separatist forces, which oppose the 
Republican tycoon. 
 
Trump and Brexit: Cognitive Dissonance 
 
Donald Trump campaigned for Brexit and against the European Union. He 
based his arguments on his mother’s Scottish origins and his investments, 
residences, and golf courses in the United Kingdom. For the New York 
businessman, Brexit was a major opportunity for his own presidential 
campaign: “I think migration has been a horrible thing for Europe, a lot of 
that was pushed by the EU. I would say that they’re better off without it, 
personally, but I’m not making that as a recommendation. Just my 
feeling.”31 In March 2016, Trump openly campaigned in favour of Brexit, 
in contrast to Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, who argued in favour of 
continued integration and liberalisation. Then-candidate Trump said, “I 
don’t want to make a comment about the UK leaving but I think they may 
leave based on – I’m there a lot, I have a lot of investments in the UK, and 
I will tell you that I think they may leave based on everything I’m 
hearing.”32 
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Trump, as a candidate, never once hesitated to become yet another force 
pushing for Brexit, building bridges with those advocating leaving the 
European Union. For Trump, this was an opportunity handed to him on a 
silver platter to build a consensus on both sides of the Atlantic while also 
fighting for the cause of Nigel Farage, Boris Johnson, Theresa May, and 
Dominic Cummings. These processes went back to their origins: 
Language, race, culture, and a great empire: The United Kingdom in 
favour of Brexit. During the Republican primaries, Donald Trump gave a 
speech on June 24 – the day after the Brexit referendum – during a visit to 
Scotland to inaugurate a golf course he owned: “It’s a great thing that 
happened,” he said, arguing that the British had “taken back their 
independence.”33 Cameron reproached the European Union for having 
failed on border control and accepting it as one of the reasons why the 
United Kingdom had voted for Brexit. The former Prime Minister was 
clear: 
 
I want that process to be as constructive as possible and I hope that the 
outcome can be as constructive as possible, because while we are 
leaving the European Union, we mustn’t be turning our backs on 
Europe. These countries are our neighbours, our friends, our allies, our 
partners, and I very much hope we’ll seek the closest possible 
relationship in terms of trade and cooperation and security, because 
that is good for us and that is good for them.34 
 
The vote in favour of Brexit was a cause for celebration for Donald Trump. 
It gave his campaign confidence and helped shape his strategy to reach the 
White House. He even invited Nigel Farage to join him at a rally in 
Jackson, Mississippi on August 24, 2016. Trump argued: “We reached 
those people who have never voted in their lives but believed by going out 
and voting for Brexit they could take back control of their country, take 
back control of their borders, and get back their pride and self-respect.”35 
That Farage campaigned for Donald Trump gave him further momentum. 
One week later, he travelled to Mexico, where his presence in the country 
was a political earthquake, as he was welcomed as a head of state, although 
the election was months away. Looking back, Trump has represented a 
watershed in North America. He is the symbol and the clearest expression 
of the end of an era for Mexico, the United States, and Canada. 
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In any case, Farage became an asset for Donald Trump, campaigning 
against Hillary Clinton and the Democratic Party throughout the United 
States. Circumstantially, Farage’s cause served for a similar purpose across 
the Atlantic: Ending the economic integration achieved by Bill Clinton in 
1994, putting a brake on human mobility, recovering state sovereignty and 
introducing stronger border controls. Although Europe and North America 
have undergone dissimilar integration processes, the forces of Brexit and 
America First equally sought to end the advance towards racial, cultural, 
and political plurality and diversity on both continents. Both processes are 
legitimate. What is questionable is achieving this through discrimination, 
exclusion, and criminalisation. As the founder of the Brexit Party has said: 
 
Campaigns on similar slogans to the stay-in-the-EU campaign, you got 
the establishment saying, ‘Everything is going just fine. Trust us.’ [But] 
actually out there in middle England, and now here in middle America, 
there’s a lot of people saying, ‘You know what, the last few years I’ve 
seen the rich get richer and our lives have not improved. It’s time for 
change,’ And the one thing that none of us can judge; Brexit happened 
because a couple million people who never voted on their lives, turned 
up because they thought this election really mattered…The opinion 
polls can say what they say. [But] on Brexit day in Britain, the remain 
side were 10-points in the lead, and yet our side still won.36 
 
Farage’s statements were something of a prophecy on the Republican 
campaign. This political project even gave way to the exceptionalist dream 
of the Founding Fathers. The realpolitik of the United States has put 
democracy, freedom, accountability, human rights, transparency, and the 
rights of minorities to the test. Brexit, in turn, represents an internal 
fracture in the United Kingdom. It is possible that it will also represent a 
fissure in terms of cooperation with Europe – not just with the European 
Union, but on other issues as well. The months and years to come will 
reveal the final outcome. 
 
In North America, the launch of the Trump campaign in June 2015 ended 
Mexico’s special role in the region. It criminalised the southern neighbour 
of the United States, threatening it with the use of military force and the 
construction of a border wall. Mexico, in turn, has been unable to 
overcome its structural problems in terms of corruption and impunity, 
although it is also true that the United States has been half-hearted in its 
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fight against the black market, the sale of firearms, and the consumption 
of drugs. Mexico, the United States, and Canada replaced NAFTA with the 
new T-MEC on January 20, 2020, based on the ideology of America First 
and the economic nationalism of the United States. As in the United 
Kingdom, Trump defined Mexicans and Latin Americans as the other. The 
ideological violence of his rhetoric and political actions has practically cast 
aside Mexico as a major partner in North America. America First and 
Brexit have shipwrecked the liberal order born out of the two world wars. 
One important difference, however, is that the countries of North America 
geographically share the continent, while the United Kingdom is an island. 
 
The Future Challenge to World Hegemony: Capitalism 
 
Although states and nationalisms have made a comeback, they face a 
major challenge: Surveillance capitalism. The study and practice of 
international security is primordially ethnocentric. During the Cold War, 
the bipolar system rested on the rivalry between two nuclear superpowers: 
The United States and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The 
tension to protect their borders and head off the actions of the other also 
had an impact on the dynamics of capitalism, which is by definition global, 
with greater scope than that of a state.37 
 
Due to these circumstances, the end of the Cold War freed up many of the 
interests and forces of capitalism that have transformed social life in 
recent decades. An essential – but not the only – component in this 
process consists of the licit and illicit movements that accompany capital 
flows. The epistemic, scientific, and technological communities that invest 
in, finance, and purchase the innovations that sustain, or even overtake, 
the state are also a key part of this formula.38 
 
Capitalism is more flexible and less regulated and bureaucratic than the 
state; profit drives it. The dilemma lies in the combination of licit and 
illicit capital flows, such as trafficking and money laundering. What is 
certain is that the two hegemons that are driving the world today are the 
United States and China. 
 
The policies of the superpowers, however, seek to define and promote a 
narrative of the other at the macro scale. This is in contrast with the micro 
movements of migrants. In both cases, the others help to unify the 
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energies and resources of the superpowers. Such is the case with the 
terrorist attacks that united the United States and the United Kingdom in 
the war on terrorism. Currently, the United States has framed China, as 
incarnated by the Communist Party, as a threat to its way of life, values, 
and institutions. The problem with this argument is that China has 
become the great rival to the Western world in the fields of nuclear power, 
the military, space, economics, and technology, where hegemony is 
decided.39 
 
In the 21st Century, two capitalist systems are struggling for leadership in 
world politics. On the one hand, there is the United States, based on a 
semi-democratic liberalism, followed by the United Kingdom. On the 
other, there is Chinese capitalism, which fosters strong economic growth 
and limits the rights and freedoms of individuals, although it overlaps with 
liberal capitalism in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. The Chinese also 
have an ancient culture. With this energy, and a workforce that can 
surpass that of any country on the face of the Earth, it is creating a new 
international leadership. It aims to export its domestic politics abroad 
through the Belt and Road initiative, which has encompassed 70 countries 
on different continents, as well as the creation of international institutions. 
Today, however, it is in crisis due to the coronavirus.40 
 
In the Victorian era, the Industrial Revolution precipitated imperialism. 
The transition from agriculture to industrial capitalism was a 
transformation of global magnitude. The accumulation of capital and the 
extraction of profit fed rivalries that magnified during the second half of 
the 19th Century through nationalism and the emerging powers: The 
United States, Germany, and Japan. The dispute over new territories and 
their appropriation also required concepts, laws, and organisational 
changes. Production chains thus expanded, in which societal energy and 
imagination crystallised in navigation routes, railways, communication 
systems, financial transactions, and banks. In sum:41 
 
The first industrial revolution spanned from about 1760 to around 
1840. Triggered by the construction of railroads and the invention of 
the steam engine, it ushered in mechanical production. The second 
industrial revolution, which started in the late 19th century and into the 
early 20th century, made mass production possible, fostered by the 
advent of electricity and the assembly line. The third industrial 
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revolution began in the 1960s. It is usually called the computer or 
digital revolution because it was catalysed by the development of 
semiconductors, mainframe computing (1960s), personal computing 
(1970s and ’80s), and the internet (1990s).42 
 
The Fourth Industrial Revolution includes big data, which plays a role in 
artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, and cyberspace. The challenge lies 
not in the information to transmit, but in the speed at which it can 
circulate, generating innovation and productivity. Industry offers a wide 
range of products: Sensors, microprocessors, drones, mobile phones, 
tablets, screens, videos, and platforms. The Fourth Industrial Revolution is 
changing the lives, behaviours, and emotions of millions of people on a 
daily basis. The digital era combines multiple technologies that are 
transforming paradigms in economics, business, and society. Likewise, it 
transforms the dynamics between countries, companies, and societies. 
These processes affect identities, altering perceptions at the local, regional, 
and global levels.43 
 
Surveillance capitalism, which extracts information on a mass scale and 
has few levels of regulation, challenges the classical notion of the state. The 
latter entity also faces the challenges of human mobility and humanitarian 
crises, terrorism, organised crime, and pandemics. The battle is both 
unequal and inarticulate. The reaction in the United Kingdom and the 
United States has been the emergence of nationalisms and a revival of the 
archaic imperial legacy, which seek to recoup something of the strength of 
yesteryear. 
 
Shoshana Zuboff has made one of the sharpest contributions in recent 
times in her work on the way in which data systems extract information 
from individuals at the global level. This theft is friendly and permits the 
tracking of the prototypes of millions of people around the world. The 
owners of these systems know where people are, as well as their 
preferences, identities, and properties. They then sell this information to 
large companies, based anywhere in the world – even to the security, 
intelligence, and defence systems of antagonistic countries. The key to this 
system is that it be indecipherable, unidentifiable, and special, such as 
when users have a good time playing a videogame or on Facebook, 
Instagram, or Google. According to Shoshana, this power of the digital era 
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can alter and predict behaviours and provide access to unauthorised 
information.44 
 
Security 
 
The appearance of the atomic bomb in 1945 transformed world history. In 
security studies, scientists and technicians, who are not exclusively part of 
the military field, come together. This sector unites public and private 
factors, civilians, and the military. Nevertheless, security studies in the 
broadest sense pale in the face of historic and global trends and processes, 
such as capitalism.45 
 
In the field of security, cyberwarfare is one of the most lethal threats. 
Cyberspace is transforming operations on land, at sea, and in the air. It 
presents geographical transformations and brings together state and non-
state actors. Conflict will alter satellites used to transmit information, 
sensors, communication systems, and decision-making processes. It 
exacerbates the balance between peace and war: It connects strategic 
facilities with civilian infrastructure. Hacking precipitates the rupture of 
the global balance. In 2010, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense argued 
that cybersecurity was the new frontier of national security and, in 2020, 
Michael Pompeo pointed out that cyberspace will be the new domain.46 
 
Conclusions 
 
Post-Brexit Implications 
 
On February 1, 2020, the United Kingdom consummated its exit from the 
European Union. The forces that drove Brexit opted for greater control 
over the state, borders, and sovereignty. One of the primary points of this 
process will be greater controls on immigration. Likewise, they will seek to 
disentangle themselves from the European Union bureaucracy; 
intelligence sharing will also decline. In terms of its identity, the United 
Kingdom has put a brake on the integration and assimilation of other races 
and cultures and, on the domestic plane, has confirmed the fragmentation 
of its society. Brexit is also the breeding ground for separatist movements. 
 
Scotland 
 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 13, No. 2
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol13/iss2/2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.2.1779
 39 
In the U.K. general elections held on December 12, 2019, the number of 
seats in the British Parliament held by the separatist Scottish National 
Party increased from 38 to 45. Party leader and First Minister of Scotland 
Nicola Sturgeon emphasised, in her electoral discourse, the role of a 
European Scotland, despite Brexit. In the 2016 referendum, a majority of 
Scots (62 percent) voted to remain in the European Union. There is no 
question that the separatist party’s excellent showing in the 2019 elections 
is at least partially due to its comprehensive anti-Brexit position. With the 
legal confirmation of the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union 
on January 31, 2020, Sturgeon announced that the flag of the European 
Union would continue flying in Scotland. For her, the European Union 
represents an opportunity to counteract Scotland’s low birth rate and the 
aging of its population. Given that the conservatives have been empowered 
in London, however, Sturgeon must moderate the path to independence, 
which will require an overwhelming victory in a referendum to enjoy 
international recognition, as well as that of the United Kingdom. This 
situation has yet to resolve itself. Sturgeon has expressed it in the follow 
words: 
 
To achieve independence, a referendum, whenever it happens – 
whether it is this year as I want, or after the next Scottish election – 
must be legal and legitimate. That is a simple fact. It must demonstrate 
clearly that there is majority support for independence, and its legality 
must be beyond doubt. Otherwise the outcome, even if successful, 
would not be recognized by other countries.47 
 
Northern Ireland 
 
Northern Ireland, in turn, opposed Brexit with 55.8 percent of the votes in 
the 2016 referendum. In 2019, the nationalist party Sinn Fein maintained 
its representation of seven seats in the House of Commons, which has 
reinvigorated its forces post-Brexit. Sinn Fein is the only party that 
operates in both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland under the 
banner of unification and the end of British jurisdiction in the north. 
 
Here, Brexit has done nothing but heighten tensions with Boris Johnson 
following the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union. It has also 
revived the movement to integrate the two Irelands, thanks to their 
Catholic roots and their ties with continental Europe. It is worth 
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remembering that the island has already gone through a nearly three-
decade unconventional war with paramilitary clashes along the border. 
 
Furthermore, the Good Friday Agreement establishes that Northern 
Ireland may leave the United Kingdom if its electorate so decides in a 
referendum. With the consummation of Brexit, Northern Ireland may 
separate from the United Kingdom due to its differences over E.U. 
membership, although, if it comes to pass, its depth and effectiveness over 
the short and medium terms are unknown.48 These processes in Scotland 
and Northern Ireland have not yet begun, at least in legal or electoral 
form. The ideas and feelings of fragmentation have taken hold in their 
peoples and in the political motivations of their leaders. The dénouements 
of these new localisms in the face of statist and anti-integrationist trends 
are unknown, but fragmentation is a fact. 
 
In 2016, the results of the Brexit referendum were as follows: 53.4 percent 
of English voters were in favour of leaving the European Union, as were 
44.3 percent of Northern Irish voters, 38 percent of Scottish voters and 
52.5 percent of Welsh voters. In the Brexit referendum, 46,501,221 citizens 
participated, representing 72.2 percent of the electorate. These numbers 
show everything except a consensus over the path that the United 
Kingdom should take in the following years.49 
 
Article 4 of the Treaty of European Union respects sovereignty on national 
security matters. Countries such as Germany and France share this vision, 
as they have not relinquished their national security decision-making 
powers. The European Union bureaucracy does not handle intelligence 
tasks, for example. Aspects such as sharing confidential intelligence are 
not a matter for the European Union, but for each member state. It is 
important to emphasise that, despite Brexit, decisions on natural security 
issues will remain part of the permanent relationship with the countries of 
continental Europe. 
 
The problems lie in the fields of law enforcement, justice, and the police. 
The position of the European Union is that the United Kingdom should 
leave Europol. In 2020, both parties will negotiate the security 
implications of Brexit, as the United Kingdom is no longer a member of 
the European Union system. From the perspective of regional security, 
reduced cooperation would be detrimental for the neighbourhood and 
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would be neither in the interests of the European Union nor those of the 
United Kingdom.50 
 
Five Eyes 
 
The future of Five Eyes is more important than ever given the global 
threats that, for example, the United States cannot face on its own. 
Furthermore, Five Eyes fosters information-sharing over transatlantic 
cables and to the Mediterranean, Asia, or the Arctic. An alliance emerging 
from World War II, it is irreplaceable due to the blood and cultural ties of 
the Anglosphere. Five Eyes is the basis of a structure for sharing trust and 
developing and expanding agreements; it is an unparalleled peer 
evaluation system. Its connections are of indispensable aid for the United 
States and the United Kingdom, but the rise of Donald Trump has 
impeded the vitality of this alliance. Nevertheless, Five Eyes builds based 
on a historical and cultural matrix that has the Anglosphere as its base. 
 
The Special Relationship 
 
The special relationship between the United States and the United 
Kingdom is one of the most high-profile alliances in the world. It currently 
boasts the antecedent of having passed from British hegemony to U.S. 
hegemony at the end of World War II. This is a unique understanding. 
Historically, the United States needs British approval to legitimate its 
decisions on the international plane, despite the power asymmetries 
between the two nations, as well as to reach places to which the United 
States does not have direct access. 
 
Since 2008, the United Kingdom has no longer been truly important for 
the United States. Germany has become more influential. As the Obama 
administration pivoted towards Asia and the Pacific, the special 
relationship lost momentum, but it entered a new stage with the personal 
contacts between Prime Minister Boris Johnson and President Donald 
Trump. Once Trump entered the White House, he openly inclined towards 
Johnson, even during the period in which Theresa May was prime 
minister. These two leaders share ideas, values, and visions of the world 
that the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union has revitalised. 
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was present during the formalisation 
of the exit of the United Kingdom in Brussels on January 31, 2020, thus 
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ratifying the special relationship and the values, strategies, and leadership 
vision of the United Kingdom and the United States over the next 
century.51 
 
One of the central concerns for Washington will be to confront China on 
every level. Here, the United Kingdom’s seat on the Security Council will 
be key. London and Washington are not in full agreement over Trump’s 
relationship with Putin, however. In addition, Washington is not pleased 
with the United Kingdom’s relationship with China on technological 
issues. For London, Russia is a real threat to the integrity of the kingdom, 
and Trump’s closeness with Putin is uncomfortable for the special 
relationship. Despite this, on intelligence and security matters, there will 
be continuity due to the long-term interests shared by the Five Eyes 
countries. Here it is vital for there to be a political convergence between 
the Five Eyes members. From the British and American perspective, what 
is at play is the architecture of the system that has been in operation in 
recent decades. This involves the role of the institutions, information, and 
culture of the area known as the West in general, and of the Anglosphere 
in particular. Iran, China, and Russia challenge these visions, interests, 
and institutions. Whether the return of the state after a period of regional 
integration will create greater confidence and security beyond the special 
relationship is unknown, given the context of the growing divisions in 
Great Britain. 
 
The European Union 
 
For Brussels, the United Kingdom is no longer a priority. There is a debate 
in the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union about 
the price the United Kingdom should pay for leaving the union, which 
represents a rejection of continental Europe. Countries such as France and 
Germany understand that the price paid should be high. The European 
Union’s priority is to keep its project of integration going in the midst of a 
debate on borders and human mobility among member states, as well as 
from regions such as Africa and the Middle East. Most of its interests – on 
which there is no consensus in Brussels – involve the region’s health, 
competitivity, and relationship with the United States, not only through 
the European Union, but also through the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. Nigel Farage has argued that Brexit is the end of the 
European Union. It is too early to tell, but it is nevertheless a clear, deep 
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wound for the dream of Jean Monnet and Robert Shuman, the proponents 
of integration. 
 
North America 
 
Mexico is redefining its role in North America in a subordinate position to 
Donald Trump. Unfortunately, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador 
did not take advantage of trade renegotiations to ensure equal conditions 
for Mexico. Trump designed the new trade agreement between Canada, 
the United States, and Mexico to aid his re-election, as the fulfilment of a 
campaign promise made to U.S. workers—and against Mexican 
sovereignty. In the end, the real risks and threats to regional security—
such as transnational organised crime, illicit money flows, and drug 
consumption—went unaddressed. 
 
The perception of danger and identity security are undermining 
possibilities for cooperation and understanding among regions and states, 
which are determined to go back to their glorious pasts, seen as an 
imperial lineage, even if this means greater vulnerability in international 
security. Despite the return to imperial and hegemonic visions instead of 
those that focus on regions, cooperation, and integration, capitalism (both 
licit and illicit) is undermining, with much more clarity and force, the state 
and what we understand as the liberal order that emerged from the two 
world wars. The simultaneous emergence of China and Russia has 
exacerbated this situation. The combination of these factors will have 
negative regional and global implications. This is particularly true for the 
most vulnerable: Less-developed countries, immigrants, international 
society, and the ecosystem. 
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